November 20, 2008




















May 7, 2003 - Distribution Channel Commentary (DCC) # 23

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THIS WEEK’S TOPICS:

  1. ESOPS MAY NOW BE THE BEST EXIT STRATEGY FOR SOMEDAY SELLERS
  2. WHY AND HOW TO MIGRATE FROM SALES COMMISSIONS TO SALARY
  3. GET "LIVING EDGE" DIRECTORS FROM TOP 3% CUSTOMERS AND SUPPLIERS
  4. SYSCO FOODSERVICE IS PLAYING CUSTOMER PROFITABILITY HARDBALL

 

  1. ESOPS MAY NOW BE THE BEST EXIT STRATEGY FOR SOMEDAY SELLERS
  2. If you are a distributor principal who hopes to sell out in the next 5 to 10 years, you should take another look at ESOPs and how to cultivate that as at least one good viable exit alternative. Why? I personally think that the stock markets are in a secular bear market that may last another 5 to 10 years. Although there may be bear market rallies of 50% appreciation as the Japanese market has had during its 14 year

    bear market, the long-term average trend will be down steadily for evaluations of private companies (no valuation rallies there!).

    Because during bear markets all capitalists lose wealth after adjustments for inflation, currency debasement and taxes, key guidelines are to maximize positive cash flow and after tax benefits. ESOPs tax benefits could look especially good in an environment of declining P/E multiples. The May issue of Inc. magazine has a good article on the why’s and how’s of ESOPs and is definitely worth checking out. The key eligiblity considerations are: have at least a $2MM valuation; have a solid, sustainable positive cash flow; with a good management team and culture who won’t run the company into the ground during tough times. Now would be the time to start to discuss, embrace and then practice "high performance service management" ideas in our video in order to be able to meet the ESOP, sell-out criteria by the time you want to sell. Here’s the link for the article: http://www.inc.com/magazine/20030501/25412.html.

  3. WHY AND HOW TO MIGRATE FROM SALES COMMISSIONS TO SALARY

Ever since 1979 when I taught my first distributor seminar at the National Paper Trade Association’s Young Executive Forum session, which happened to be on "Solving the Small Order Problem", I have been able to get executives to shake their heads both ways at the same time. "Yes, we have a big opportunity/problem!" And, "No, we won’t/can’t do it, because the sales force wouldn’t stand for it".

One of the big reasons why sales reps resist any bigger changes that could make a real difference for the company is the incentive plan culture in which they have grown. So, why not change the incentive plan to a salary plus total company gainsharing plan? If that sounds daunting, then you need to read the short, but excellent article by Norm Brodsky in the May issue of Inc. magazine. (Another Inc. article? Yep! There have been many issues of Inc. that I have pitched without finding anything of interest, but every once in awhile I find two or more good articles!). He does a nice job on the why’s and how’s of going from commission to salary. Here’s the link, but come back, because I can add more to his suggested solutions: http://www.inc.com/magazine/20030501/25416.html

If you do change any incentive plans, make sure that you don’t do it in a strategic vacuum. Your very best sales reps are going to be wary about being averaged into (and weighted down thereafter) by the bottom 80% of the sales force. To get the best reps to go along with compensation changes, they have to believe that the new, improved, refined strategic direction and initiatives will be better for them in the long run. Will the strategy reduce their risks and/or increase their expected, discounted, net present value income stream from the one they currently have? This is not a challenge that is easy to teach, sell and execute.

A few tools to help you get there:

  1. Check out article # 2.1 (2_1.asp) at our site entitled "Achieving Sustainable Profit Power" that introduces the "kinetic chain" and its 7 sequential shaping, reinforcing steps with "incentive plans" being in 7th and last place. In other words, if you don’t rethink the first six steps to make sure that they are consistent with and supporting of any given incentive plan, then the new plan won’t work for more than a few weeks.
  2. Step 1 of the kinetic chain is "leadership/management" which, these days, has to be a collective, somewhat democratic team solution guided and disciplined by non-negotiable, economic, strategic and service metrics. Step 2 is "strategy" on which a ton of commentary has been spent, because 95% of all distributors do not have any agreement or alignment on their strategy. Let’s assume that you have bought into all of my customer-centric, profitability ranking plays to help you define your historic, most profitable, customer niche and then re-organize your distribution business for high performance profit growth. Now what?
  3. You aren’t going to get management and the sales force to buy into the customer-centric, profitability ranking plays without a lot of educational, "dialogue" sessions around fact-based realities. Our 53 step, come-to-high-performance-principles and say "Amen" solution for guiding this process is our "High Performance…" video. It’s unconditionally guaranteed! If you don’t believe it, go to our home page and read "what executives are saying" testimonials (./products/exec_comments.asp). Check the resellers list to see if one of your affiliation groups is a reseller (they sell for a lot less). If not, get one of your groups – association, buying group, software firm, key manufacturer – to become one; it’s an easy, no hassle process for them. Then, you have 30 days to review and return the product if you don’t think the video will help you to move towards high performance results for all stakeholders.

    So, Norm Brodsky is right, all distributors that still have their sales force on commissions will have to change their compensation plans and their culture to make new, crystallized strategic moves work. But, first you need the right strategy, then reweave the entire kinetic chain to finally make any new compensation plan really work for you.

  4. GET "LIVING EDGE" DIRECTORS FROM TOP 3% CUSTOMERS AND SUPPLIERS

A reader wrote in stating that he was a bit confused about my definitions and recommended practices for different types of important customers: "core, target, gazelle and living edge". Knowing how guilty I am of borrowing and coining terms, I thought a review of the customer types and a few relationship guidelines might help. Before jumping into my taxonomy for customers, a few caveats:

  1. Classification names for customers are necessarily rough approximations; any one customer will not necessarily fit perfectly into any category. Our goal is to be roughly right to a degree that allows us to out-perform our competitors at how we segment, serve and grow best accounts.
  2. Customers can initially fool you, so reserve the right to reclassify them as needed.
  3. The four types mentioned above can overlap. A core customer could, for example, also be in one or all of the other categories.

On to the definitions: "core customers" are the 5 or so out of the top 10+ most profitable customers that we have at a given distribution location that can all comfortably fit into the same niche; they are birds of a feather. While there can be a bit of art required in defining all of the aspects of this niche and why they buy most everything from us, one thing they do have in common is that they buy a lot of our fastest moving, higher fill rate items. In fact, their collective pleas over time have been one of the key shaping forces for why a given location stocks what it does and often differs significantly from what other locations within the same chain can have. Because we sell core accounts lots of fast movers in larger than average orders often with more lines per order due to (in)formal replenishment systems, these accounts are sensationally profitable.

Once we have identified the core accounts, there are a number of measures that we can pursue with them to better serve, keep and grow them. They are key to both personifying the niche and measuring what good service really is for all of our front-line employees. Specific ideas for what to do are enumerated in: DCC # 9.2, 9commentary.asp; article # 5.75_7.asp
and module #s 3.1 and 3.4 in our "High Performance.." video.

More specifically, when it comes to strategically increasing fill rates for a more perfectly rounded out one-stop-array for these core customers; there are two DCC topics to check out:

DCC # 8.3 describes a case study of what one company did internally to get everyone helping to improve effective fill-rates. 8commentary.asp

DCC # 10.3 explains how a distributor might get core customers to help manage the one-stop-shop array of items for the niche of which they are a part.10commentary.asp

Target accounts are the 5 or so most likely to improve accounts in our defined #1 niche for which we aren’t the #1 supplier and for which we think we have the best chance of capturing significant new share of account volume in a year’s time or less. There are a number of selection criteria that we could use to pick these target accounts for each distribution location, but two of the big reasons to pursue them should be:

  1. With our re-tuned and improved service metrics starring highest fill rates on the most robust one-stop-array of items for the niche, we now have a measurably, distinctively better (lowest) total procurement cost solution to offer them than any other competitor in a given location area. And,
  2. If:

*our entire team is looking for chances to perform heroic, extra service actions to do for them;

*we schedule team selling by all personnel who could possibly help build relationships and see new
ways to help the customer;

*the two above combined with a best account cracking sales rep (re)assigned to the account.

Then, we can typically make our luck start to work within these accounts within 3 to 6 months. Our luck will often happen at the intersection of the goodwill we have generated and an entrenched competitor dropping a few service balls or not following through on a new opportunity as quickly as our hero team.

Gazelle accounts are the 1 to 3% of the customers within our #1 niche that are growing 2 to 5x faster than their peers and very profitably so, because they are perpetual value-creation innovators on a mission for their customers. They don’t talk about what they should be doing; they act quickly and try lots of cheap experiments to fall forward toward their vision to learn and try again smarter. They have all of the bottom-up, can do spirit needed to make new stuff happen. All employees emote a sense of ambition and destiny, they aren’t just trying to be consistently better than the rest, they want to reinvent their industry, be world-beaters. Any employee in the company can tell you what "we" (not "they" in the corner offices) do to be the best value proposition for some target customer and what’s in it for them and why they love working there.

Gazelles are rare enough that if there are only 50 accounts in your number one niche at a given location, there might not be a true gazelle in your niche/market. Distribution chains with 1000 active accounts or more will statistically have some gazelles that should be on corporate management’s team selling schedule. I was a top executive with a mid-west, distribution chain in the mid-‘70s. At this time I obsessed with partnering with Caterpillar Tractor at $4B in sales in ’74 on its way to $14 B in ’80 and a ’75 start up in Memphis called FedEx. They both took our chain for an awesome ride.

"Living Edge" customers are like gazelles in the sense that they are perpetual innovators, but they do all of their innovating in small, incremental ways often without understanding their underlying strategic market proposition in a formal way. They don’t have world-beating ambition and goals, they just like to try new incremental stuff with a rational, objective view of the world. They intuitively understand or quickly learn "total procurement cost" purchasing, and they know how to partner with all of their stakeholders to create 1 + 1=3 or more economics to share.

Living Edge customers are the best to work with on trying to improve inter-company process re-engineering that can then be applied to the rest of the niche. Gazelles, on the other hand, will tell you what breakthrough new things that they expect of you which the rest of the niche may never understand or dare to try. Living Edgers also tend to move into new production areas that are extensions of the past; these efforts need new inventory item support. The higher-energy, lower-concept, fast followers within the niche will then copy the living edgers and start consuming new products, especially if you are able to teach them why and how to do the new production activity.

In a way this taxonomy for customers can also be applied to suppliers and distributors. A big question is do the best types of customers and suppliers see you, the distributor, as one of these best types of partners? If so, then as a winner you can ask winning customers and suppliers if they would like to work together with you on a more formal team-to-team basis. Here are some guidelines and ideas for how:

For the core customers/suppliers, team to team interaction is focused on proactive maintenance and over-looked "old to old" selling opportunities. (For more on "old to old" deep thinking and applications see DCCs # 13.2, 14.3 13commentary.asp), (14commentary.asp). For target key account case study ideas see DDC #9.3 (9commentary.asp.

For target customers/suppliers the team-selling is focused on building a relationship rope of many strands comprised of our people to their counterpart people with common, constant agenda items of:

  1. How could we work with you better in order to not only lower your TPC for goods, but to also improve your internal productivity to grow your bottom line.
  2. What have been the best and worst service incidents that you have experienced (at each contact point/level)? What can we learn from that? How can we change to guarantee you a higher level of better total service value and experience?
  3. What are your latest, new initiatives that will cause changes in what and how you might purchase? Our first opportunities will often come with new needs or old needs for which a competitor has been slow or weak at solving.

For the living edge customers, we might try to create a working committee of 3 to 5 of these customers at each location. It is important that they don’t compete head-to-head with one another, that we probably already know and get along with each other and like to brainstorm together (good chemistry). The goal should be to meet 2 to 4 times per year depending upon how many compelling projects and issues arise for an agenda. We would provide the organizational energy with their agenda input and pay for the (off site?) meeting expenses. Honorariums to get them to show up and care are usually not needed; they are on the win-win hook, especially if we follow up to make sure that win-win benefits or worthwhile lessons come out of the experiments that are concocted. This committee of guinea pigs for new, incremental stuff is really an applied research effort to give each distribution location new growth opportunities that can be sold to much of the remainder of the core niche. The new stuff will be both product centric and extra services. The extra services may apply to few, large accounts and/or have to be sold on an un-bundled basis to most of the niche’s customers.

Working with living edge suppliers should be done at the corporate, not branch, level. We should be looking for the incremental innovators that are ideally predominate #1s in their respective niche with upward momentum that have a lot of product line overlap with the present and/or future needs of our #1 niche of customers. Unless some manufacturer comes along with a world-beating, new selling proposition offering territorial exclusives around which new selling divisions can be built, we should choose the customer niche we want to own first, then choose the appropriate living edge suppliers to support the customer niche second. A key mind-shift for most traditional distribution channel executives.

As for the gazelles that you might spot, they may well require a corporate level: brain trust, background research effort, discretionary development funds budget and a total get to know them and partner them team effort. Don’t expect your local branch manager and the sales rep who happens to be calling on the gazelle HQ to land these opportunities by following company procedures. For some coverage on how the best suppliers and the not so successful suppliers work read the Wal-Mart review in the second half of DCC # 14.2 ("re-thinking key account tactics") (14commentary.asp

4. SYSCO FOODSERVICE IS PLAYING CUSTOMER PROFITABILITY HARDBALL

Regular readers of these DCCs know that I think every distributor in the US needs to re-think their entire business around customer profitability ranking reports. I was intrigued by a recent story about how Sysco, the $23B behemoth of the foodservice distribution channel, plays customer profitability ranking hardball. What is the between the lines story that should speak to both Sysco and it’s 2800 local and regional broadline distributors? Here is some: history; article quotes; and final thoughts.

First some background. As a long-time student of both independent distribution channels and Sysco, here is my view of how Sysco grew up. Sysco may have been the original "poof", publicly-traded, distribution company. It was formed by about eight private distributors all putting their stock into one pot to create a $115MM revenue company that went public in 1970 at the tail end of an IPO frenzy. The fact that the stock market started to slide toward an ultimate bottom in ’74 perhaps saved Sysco from expanding too rapidly like the publicly traded distribution roll-ups of the late ‘90s. Those guys rushed to take advantage of a bull-market blow-off and often bought too many companies, too fast at too high prices and now are either bankrupt or faltering badly with acute operational indigestion, too much debt and declining sales in a tough post-bubble economy.

From the outset, Sysco had two strategic levers to work that most other chains don’t. The first lever is there are large, commodity, volume, price-sensitive regional/national contracts to be won that really work. There are, for example, monster "infeeder" service companies. These service companies run corporate and institutional cafeterias on out-sourced contracts. In many other channels, there are national distributors that go after national accounts at HQs that look good on paper, but the compliance by the local facilities is quite spotty. Often the local plants are far more sensitive to special, local stocking needs and very reliable service than are the local infeeder buyers.

The second and bigger lever is that private label products are a majority of sales in the foodservice channel; no other distribution channel has as much private label volume. This has allowed Sysco to make a total science out of lowering total costs on their national private label goods. I would guess that they may make more money as a percent of sales on the buy side through private labeling than any other distributor in any channel. The service excellence/value side of their business, however, is Sysco’s weakness; they have a record of being very inconsistent on service quality across their locations and generally below average compared to local independents.

Now for the article from the 4-27-03 issue of the New York Times entitled: "A Deft (some say heavy) Hand in the Kitchen"( the URL is at the bottom), here are some quotes:

"some chefs said they were put off by the thought of a deeper relationship with Sysco….Sysco pressures them to continually increase their orders, threatening to drop them if they don’t…there is a widely held belief that Sysco is this 500-lb. gorilla that bullies operators."

"(says the Sysco CEO) the company runs a profitability analysis on each of its 400,000 customers. If they do not make the cut, we either ask for a bigger order, reduce service by sending trucks out less often or help find them another distributor."

"Chefs also complain that Sysco offers rock-bottom pricing on crucial ‘center of the plate’ foods like chicken or steak, only to make it up by charging high prices on other products…Sysco sells more than 300,000 products." The URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/27/business/yourmoney/27SYSC.html
(you have to be a subscriber to New York Times to read.)

What do I conclude?

  1. Sysco has been so successful with their on-going roll-up with their centralized command-and-control management of: private label purchasing and regional/national contract wins, they obviously can afford to have less consistent service and diplomacy at the local branch level. Can they keep doing what they do best AND overhaul their local service culture? In theory, yes, but given the intensity and age of their methods it is unlikely.
  2. At $23 billion in sales how much more market share and accretive earnings deals can they do? How much more juice can they squeeze out of suppliers on the private label deals? Will the infeeder accounts continue to put up with the bargain prices and bargain service, etc.? I suspect that Sysco’s growth rate will slow, because of the law of big numbers, but with only 13% share of the foodservice channel market, they could still grow for awhile. They can still do a number of "fold in" deals in which they buy a distributor, close down their facility and run it out of one of their 147 locations. They have wonderful economic momentum to their numbers over the past 5 years, and US Foodservice, I believe, will lose a chunk of their $17 B to Sysco and many other distributors too (DCC #s 14.2, 18.5).14commentary.asp; 18commentary.asp.
  3. I infer that there is a weakness in how Sysco does their customer profitability analysis in addition to their heavy-handedness. This could be an opportunity for the other 2800 broadliners. I’m guessing that with 300,000 items and 400,000 active accounts, Sysco has been collecting both groups through acquisitions of all types. It doesn’t sound like Sysco is using their profitability reports on a location basis to determine from rankings what the local branches best historic customer niche has been. This should allow the local competitors to do better niche targeting, segmenting and service selling.
  4. Often when a big national chain buys X% better than small local and regional guys, they waste it on poor service economics at the local level. They can’t turn the local service around until they first find a better way to hire, service-value train and keep better branch managers for longer tenures at the locations. This allows the locals to win the day with better niching, better focused service execution and more diplomatic, cooperative order building moves with customers. In this case, Sysco is legitimizing the need for customer profitability and order size building. By decreeing that the customer figure it out, so Sysco can make more money, it allows the competition to be the nice guy. The counter message should be:
    1. We have such reliable service metrics tuned to your type of business, you can trust us and park all of your business with us.
    2. We will help you get a larger order size as a by-product of helping you to rethink your planning and replenishment systems. This will help you to lower your TPC and improve your internal productivity. set order size through better planning and replenishment system ideas that lower the customers’ TPC and improve their internal productivity.

That’s all for this week!

Bruce

Bruce@merrifield.com, 919-933-7474